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Risk Management in Everyday Insurance Decisions: 
Evidence from a Process Tracing Study 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examined the applicability of Huber’s (1997) model of risk management to 
a real world consumer insurance decision, namely whether to insure a recently 
purchased item against possible mechanical breakdown in the future.  Huber argued 
that decision makers manage the risks of negative outcomes by applying one or more 
defusing operators. Respondents in this study asked for whatever information they felt 
necessary to decide whether to take out an extended warranty on two consumer 
products of differing values.  We found support for most aspects of the model, 
particularly in relation to risk defusing operators, but also identified some respondents 
who could not easily be accommodated within it, i.e. those who perceived risk, but did 
not seem prepared to take any action. We also found evidence for recognition primed 
insurance decisions. The results are interpreted from a bounded rationality 
perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
When someone buys a consumer product they face the risk that the product 
may fail, leaving them inconvenienced and possibly out of pocket, as they pay to have 
the item repaired. The focus of this research is to explore how people think about and 
act to manage future risks of product failure, at the point of purchase. In an interview 
setting, respondents were asked to choose a new washing machine, and a second hand 
car, and then to decide whether to take insurance in the form of an extended warranty 
to give protection against breakdown after the initial guarantee had expired. The study 
was designed to examine three issues. First, to describe risk management strategies 
within a bounded rationality perspective, and more specifically, to assess the extent to 
which Huber’s (1997) theory of risk management can be used to model real world 
risky decisions involving product warranty insurance. Second, to investigate the role 
of key variables associated with risk management strategies, such as cost of insurance, 
previous experience and risk perception. Finally, to identify the kind of information 
people seek in a context where they are not presented with it, but have to search for it. 
A traditional way of investigating insurance decisions would be to frame them 
within a lottery paradigm, and ask people to make choices between scenarios varying 
in losses and outcome probabilities.  However a major problem with this is that 
outcome probabilities are very clearly specified (well defined) whereas most real life 
risks are vague or ambiguous (ill defined).  One research strategy designed to 
overcome the limitations of the traditional paradigm, is to gradually extend 
experimental lottery studies to incorporate the source of uncertainty  (ill versus well 
defined) as an independent variable.  This evolutionary strategy has developed over 
the last 15 years with the now extensive body of research on the effects of ambiguity 
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on choice (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995; Tversky and 
Fox, 1995). 
An alternative reaction to the limitations of the experimental lottery is 
exemplified by the naturalistic decision making  (NDM) school of thought (Klein, 
Orasanu, Calderwood and Zsambok, 1993).  This more radical research strategy 
argues that the approach taken in experimental psychology and behavioural economics 
is rigorous but not relevant to real life decision making. They argue that the way 
forward is to only study  real-life decisions and this requires giving up some rigour to 
achieve relevance.  Unlike many in the NDM movement we feel that simulations 
using realistic choice alternatives can yield valid insights into how people deal with 
real life. The use of such simulations has enabled us to develop a process tracing 
method suitable for the study of economic decisions made by ordinary citizens.  This 
involves a synthesis of interview methods used by NDM researchers and an 
information search monitoring method developed by Huber, Wider and Huber (1997).  
By allowing people to actively seek information in a supportive interview context our 
method identifies the information people perceive as important to their financial 
decisions and risk management. Our interview setting is not intended to be realistic, in 
that respondents do not actually make a financial commitment, and conditions are not 
identical to those faced in an actual retail environment. A supportive researcher who 
offers to provide information on request is clearly different from a retail environment, 
where information may be proffered in a more ‘hard sell’ mode, or the customer is left 
to find information out for themselves. An important advantage of our method is that 
all respondents are treated in a consistent manner, unlike in actual retail environments, 
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and therefore we could gain more consistent information about what people would 
choose to do, when the variable of sales technique was controlled. 
 
Previous research on insurance 
According to the Expected Utility (EU) model (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1947) people buy insurance because it has greater expected utility than 
does not buying insurance.  However, Kunreuther et al’s (1978) field study of the 
purchase of flood and earthquake insurance concluded that the EU model is an 
inadequate description of the choice process in relation to insurance purchases, and 
this view was further confirmed in a series of laboratory studies (see also Kunreuther, 
1996).   More recently, Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros and Kunreuther (1993) showed 
that the framing manipulations in their experimental study of insurance purchase 
could lead consumers to make choices that violated basic laws of probability and 
value, and that similar choice patterns also occurred in real life insurance decisions.  
Connor (1996) in a study of framing effects in relation to insurance decisions, 
suggested that the attraction of insurance cannot be explained solely by risk reduction 
or by EU theory.  His results strongly suggested that it was also the investment aspect 
of insurance which causes non-EU attraction i.e. ‘that people may place extra value on 
the reversal of something bad when the reversal is caused by a prior investment or 
precautionary measure’ (p. 42). Finally, other research has found that people prefer 
insurance to other methods of risk management, even if those other methods are 
identical in terms of expected utility (Schoemaker and Kunreuther,1979; Hershey and 
Schoemaker, 1980). 
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Expected Utility theory, then, does not seem to wholly explain why people 
purchase insurance; background knowledge and real life information are increasingly 
being recognised as important variables, and this is reflected in recent research.  For 
example, Hogarth and Kunreuther (1995) in a study of warranty purchase, commented 
that people have to make real world decisions while lacking relevant information 
about probabilities and outcomes; they refer to this as decision making under 
ignorance, rather than under risk and uncertainty.    By varying the amount of 
information about probabilities and losses that people were given (from precise to 
none), Hogarth and Kunreuther (1995) found that people behaved differently 
according to the information they had on probabilities, and that economic cost-benefit 
models did not yield good accounts of respondents’ decisions. Under conditions of 
ignorance, i.e. when no information was given, there was a greater probability of 
warranty purchase than when precise details of probabilities and costs were supplied. 
In many situations it is very difficult for a decision maker to access all the information 
needed to make a rational choice: he or she is usually faced with an ill-defined risk 
problem.   One of the major objectives of our study is to identify the types of 
information which people seek in an ill-defined naturalistic task, and more specifically 
how insurance options are evaluated. In order to do this we present respondents with a 
minimal description of the insurance decision problem and encourage them to request 
any information they need to make their choice.  
 
A bounded rationality perspective 
Simon (1957) introduced the notion of ‘bounded rationality’ which takes 
account of the limited cognitive abilities of humans to carry out the calculations 
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necessary (even if they could access the relevant information) to realistically assess 
the degree of risk which they face. The decision maker therefore operates within a 
very much simplified model of the world, and one in which prior personal experience 
carries much weight.  Huber et al (1997) comment that one of the main differences 
between real world decisions and gambles is that in real world decisions, background 
knowledge plays an important role, for example, in finding out which alternatives 
exist, what consequences they have, or how the decision maker can avoid a negative 
outcome. The importance of memory and prior experience in decision making has also 
been emphasised by Weber, Goldstein and Barlas (1995). Klein, Calderwood and 
McGregor (1989) have used the term ‘recognition primed decision’ to account for 
some expert decision making.  One of their major findings was that experts’ ability to 
make decisions appears to depend on their skill at recognising situations as typical and 
familiar, and in many aspects of everyday life consumers have also developed such 
skills. 
Huber (1997) has developed a bounded rationality model of decision making 
in real world risky situations, using evidence gained from scenario-based risky 
decision tasks.  He hypothesized that the decision maker constructs a relatively simple 
mental representation of the situation and the alternatives, whereby a risk is either 
perceived or not.  The sub-process risk management is then activated if uncertainty 
about negative outcomes which may result from the choice of a specific alternative is 
perceived.  Once some form of risk is detected, the decision maker attempts to solve 
the problem by employing one or more defusing operator. The defusing operators 
employed will depend upon the task, but Huber suggested the following. 
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1.    Precautions involve actions taken in advance of negative consequences which 
buffer their impact, for example, buying insurance.  
2. Control actions are attempts to reduce the probability of the negative event by 
exerting control over relevant variables. 
3.  Introduction of a new alternative to defuse the risk, the aim being to keep the 
positive but avoid the negative aspects. 
4.  Worst case plans are attempts to neutralise negative outcomes after the critical 
event has occurred, and do not require immediate action.  They can often be 
identified by the phrase ‘If this happens I can always...’ or ‘At worst, I can ...’ 
(Huber, 1997, p.153). 
5.   Long term plans become relevant when the same decision situation is expected to 
occur again later. They may have been made some time in the past to deal with 
problems of a certain type, of which the present decision may be an example. 
 Huber (1997) argued that unlike in gamble tasks, people may only become 
interested in the precise probability of an event’s occurrence when none of the 
defusing operators above result in a satisfactory outcome.  In the tasks they used, they 
found that only a minority of respondents requested any probability information and 
no one was interested in precise probability.  Huber claims that such evidence 
questions the validity of models which postulate a central role for subjective 
probabilities in real world risky decisions.  Another of our objectives in this study was 
to explore whether people use their prior experience and background knowledge to 
manage the risk of product failure, and, linked to Huber’s work, to examine the degree 
of interest in probability of product breakdown. 
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 In conclusion, both studies of insurance and of other scenario-based real world 
risky decisions suggest that the Expected Utility model is an inadequate description of  
choice processes involving risk in the real world. Huber’s (1997) model seems to 
provide a promising alternative conception of risk management in real world risky 
decisions. 
 
2. Method 
Design 
 The data used in this study were obtained as part of a larger study designed to 
evaluate new process tracing methods for the study of naturalistic risky decisions.  
Full descriptions of the method can be found in Ranyard, Williamson, Cuthbert and 
Hill (1999) and in Williamson, Ranyard and Cuthbert (in press). 
The basic method was based upon Huber et al’s (1997) Active Information 
Search (AIS) procedure, in which respondents were given a basic written minimal 
description of a risky decision scenario, and their task was then to ask as many 
questions as they wished to enable them to make decisions. Respondents’ questions 
about the various options were responded to orally, rather than in written form by the 
interviewer who took the role of a helpful consultant, but one who only gave the specific 
information requested. This procedure resulted in protocols consisting of respondents’ 
questions and comments, and the replies given by the researcher.  The content, order 
and organisation of protocol sequences could then be used as evidence of respondents’ 
evaluation strategies.  Finally, post-decision summaries which required respondents to 
summarise in their own words how they reached their final decisions were included 
for all respondents. 
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  As discussed earlier, there are differences between this situation and a real 
situation – in a real situation there would be many more choices of washers and cars, 
and this in itself may have affected the decisions. However in order to keep the task 
manageable (as people also had several other decisions to make) we had asked people 
to imagine that they had narrowed their choice to a final three – probably a reasonable 
consideration set for most people’s decisions, given the number of variables which 
need to be considered. We do acknowledge that because none of the washers/cars may 
have been considered in reality, this may have affected the desire to insure or not.  
Nevertheless, respondents became very engaged in these tasks and the risk 
management strategies identified by this approach are likely to transfer to real 
decision contexts. 
 
Decision Scenarios  
Respondents were asked to complete two tasks, each involving four decisions, 
only the first and last of which will be considered in this paper.  In both tasks (the 
purchase of a new washing machine, and a second-hand car) respondents had to (a) 
choose among three products, (b) choose which form of credit to pay with and (c) 
decide whether to insure their credit repayments. Finally they had to decide whether to 
take out an extended warranty (a form of insurance against product failure) on their 
chosen product.  All respondents completed both the car and washing machine tasks, 
with the order of completion counterbalanced to control for order effects.  For the car 
task, respondents were told that a six-month warranty was included in the purchase 
price of the car, but that they could, for a further sum, insure their chosen car against 
breakdown for another two years.   An actual mechanical breakdown policy was used 
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in order to answer respondents’ questions.    For the washer task, respondents were 
told that the manufacturer’s warranty would cover their chosen washer for the first 
twelve months, but that they could then choose to take an extended warranty to cover 
mechanical breakdown for another two or four years; again an actual policy was used 
to answer respondents’ questions.  A price manipulation was also included here; half 
the respondents were given the actual price of the warranties, and the rest received a 
price which was half that of the actual price.  Note that respondents had to ask for 
price information, along with anything else they wanted to know, and not everyone 
did ask about price.   
 
Respondents 
 An opportunity sample of 96 adults was recruited for the study; full time 
students, and those who had no experience of using credit were excluded.   The 
advantage in using such an opportunity sample is obvious – they were relatively easy to 
find and keen to participate. The limitations of such a sample are acknowledged 
however, and it is possible that  potential bias could have been  introduced by the use of 
such a method.  However, a wide range of socio-economic and employment groups 
were represented in the sample, including manual, semi skilled and professional 
occupations. A variety of means were used for recruitment, including advertisements in 
local public places, and more direct face to face recruitment.  Respondents were paid for 
their participation.  The sample consisted of 42 males and 54 females in the following 
age categories: 18 – 24, 5 respondents; 25 – 44, 57 respondents; 45 – 64, 32 
respondents; 65+, 2 respondents. 
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Procedure 
 Respondents were interviewed individually, in a quiet location, often in college 
premises, but sometimes in the respondent’s home or place of work. Interruptions and 
distractions were kept to a minimum. Respondents were given a brief orientation as to 
the aims of the study, were assured of anonymity, and advised of their right to withdraw 
at any time. Permission was sought to tape record the protocols. In practice no 
respondent withdrew, or refused permission to tape the interview. Respondents then 
completed both decision scenarios (car and washer tasks) as outlined earlier. After each 
task, respondents completed a questionnaire relating to the choices they had just made. 
This allowed them to rate the attractiveness of the various options they had been given, 
and to rate their confidence in their final decisions. They also completed a general 
questionnaire, which asked for demographic details and details of previous experiences 
of credit and insurance. Respondents were advised that they could leave any section 
blank, if they did not wish to complete it. At the end of the interview, respondents were 
given the opportunity to ask for more information about the study (which most did), 
were paid and thanked for their participation.   Each tape recorded interview was then 
transcribed in full, with the relevant sections used in the qualitative analysis. Due to 
technical difficulties, one respondent’s interview was unusable and their data was not 
included in further analysis. 
 
3. Results 
 Both quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (protocol) data was collected 
and analysed in order to explore respondents’ extended warranty decisions.  However, 
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an initial analysis was undertaken on respondents’ car and washer choices, in order to 
look for possible links between product choice and perceived need for a warranty.  We 
then looked at prior experience of product breakdown and warranties, to assess the 
extent to which these factors might have some effect on decisions.  Finally we 
classified respondents according to their risk management strategies, and looked for 
evidence of Huber’s (1997) defusing operators.  
 
Product choice and risk management 
 The questions which respondents asked about the products should indicate the 
extent to which they were concerned with their reliability. Table 1 summarises the 
range and quantity of questions asked about the various products. Much information 
about reliability of the cars and washing machines was available (in the form of 
Which reports etc.), although because the method used allowed respondents to 
formulate their own questions, not everyone asked about this.  In relation to the 
washer 18 % of the questions concerned reliability in some direct sense, although 
there were other questions which might also be seen as assessing reliability in some 
way, for example those about the particular manufacturer, or about number of 
programs – a commonly expressed view was that the more programs there were, the 
more chance there was of something going wrong.  In relation to the car, there were 
less direct questions about reliability; however many of the questions could be seen as 
trying to assess reliability in more indirect ways – asking about the service history, 
number of previous owners, accidents, garage reports etc. The questions asked by 
respondents about the products, then, confirm that the risk of product failure was a 
significant concern at the point of purchase. 
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Table 1 here 
 
Effects of previous experience on extended warranty decisions 
 In a questionnaire administered after the task had been completed respondents 
were asked about their previous real life experience of extended warranties. From this 
the following categories were derived: (1) those who had not previously taken out an 
extended warranty; (2) those who had taken out an extended warranty previously but 
had not made a claim on the policy; (3) those who had taken out this form of 
insurance previously and had made a successful claim.  The percentages of 
respondents falling into each of the above categories who agreed to take out the 
extended warranty on the washer or car purchase are shown in Table 2. For both 
products, respondents who had previous experience of extended warranties were more 
likely to take out the warranty again in this simulation task than those who had no 
such experience; however, this relationship was significant for the washer task only. 
Table 2 here 
In order to examine the effects of recent breakdown experience on extended 
warranty decisions respondents were asked if their car or washing machine had 
needed a costly repair (defined as costing more than £50) in the last twelve months. 
Twenty eight percent of respondents who owned a car indicated that such a repair had 
been necessary compared with 19% for washer owners. Of those whose washers had 
broken down, 76% took the extended warranty compared with 52% of respondents 
without this breakdown experience (χ2 = 3.35, df = 1, p = 0.07). For the car task, 46% 
of respondents with recent breakdown experience took the warranty compared with 
41% of respondents without this kind of breakdown experience (χ2 = 0.15, df = 1, p > 
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.05). Thus, the relationship between respondents’ recent breakdown experience and 
their decision to take out the extended warranty was almost significant for the washer 
task although this was not the case for the car. 
In summary then, experience of recent product breakdown had a marginal 
effect in relation to the washer task, though the number of respondents involved in 
this analysis was small. However, there was some indication that people who had 
taken warranties in the past would be more likely to do so again in the future, 
particularly if a successful claim had been made. 
 
Perceived Risk of Breakdown and Warranty Choice 
 We then examined whether respondents who decided to take out a warranty 
perceived a greater risk of product breakdown than those who did not. Risk perception 
was addressed by a number of questions contained in the post-choice questionnaire.  
For the car task respondents were asked to estimate the probability of their chosen car 
breaking down in the next 3 years (0% - 100%), the likelihood that this would be a 
major repair (defined as costing £300 or more), and the likelihood of this repair being 
covered by the warranty (on a 1-9 scale where 1 signified ‘very unlikely’, 5 ‘fairly 
likely’ and 9 ‘very likely’). 
Breakdown probability estimates were equal for respondents who chose the 
warranty (40%). However, respondents who chose the warranty thought it was more 
likely that the breakdown costs would be more than £300, compared to those who 
rejected it (Median 4.5 versus 3, z = -2.49, p = 0.01). They were also more likely to 
think that any breakdown costs would be covered by the warranty (Median 6 versus 4, 
z = -4.14, p < 0.001).  Hence, whilst respondents who chose the warranty did not give 
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higher estimates of breakdown probability per se, they did believe that there was a 
higher probability that the repairs would cost more than £300, and had more 
confidence that the repairs would be covered by the warranty.  
 In relation to the washing machine task, respondents were asked about the 
probability of their chosen machine breaking down in the next 3 and 5 years (0% – 
100%).  These time limits corresponded with the period of guarantee available to the 
respondents (i.e. one year manufacturer’s warranty plus 2 or 4 year extended 
warranty).  In this case, breakdown probability estimates were significantly higher for 
respondents who chose to take out the extended warranty compared to those who did 
not. The median estimates for the 3 year period were 24% and 20% respectively (z = -
3.31, p = 0.001), and for the 5 year period 60% and 40% (z  = -4.17, p < 0.001). 
In summary then, for the car task there were no differences in perceived 
likelihood of breakdown between warranty and non-warranty takers, but warranty 
takers were more pessimistic about the likely cost of repairs, and more optimistic that 
the warranty would cover the cost of repairs.  In relation to the washer task, there were 
differences in perceived likelihood of breakdown between warranty and non-warranty 
takers, with the warranty takers being significantly more pessimistic – this finding was 
borne out in the protocols, described in a later section. 
 
Warranty information and risk management. 
The questions which respondents asked about the warranty were classified into 
five main categories, and their incidence within the protocols is presented in Table 3. 
About 20% of respondents asked no questions at all about the extended warranty 
policies offered. Nearly all of these decided against insurance.  Of the respondents 
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who did ask questions about the insurance, a large majority wanted to know the 
financial cost, whilst a substantial proportion wanted to know more about the terms 
and conditions of the insurance cover. These were by far the most common types of 
questions for both products, and appear to be the most important factors influencing 
respondents’ insurance evaluations. In addition, some respondents asked about the 
duration of the warranty period and some asked whether the full cost of the insurance 
had to be paid at the time of purchase or whether it could be added to their finance 
agreement. Finally, a small number of respondents sought information concerning the 
manufacturer’s own warranty, the insurer’s underwriter and the claims procedure.  
Table 3 here 
 The influence of cost on warranty decisions was further examined by 
manipulating the cost information given to respondents.   As explained earlier, 
respondents had been randomly divided into two groups, one group being told the 
actual cost, and the other being told a cost half that of the actual cost.  The effects of 
cost on respondents’ willingness to take out the warranty could then be examined.   
Within the subset of respondents who asked for the cost (just over 70% for each task) 
there was a significant correlation between the cost of the warranty supplied and the 
decision to take it, for both the washer (Pearson’s r = 0.27, n = 70, p < .05,), and for 
the car (Pearson’s r = 0.43, n = 68, p. < .01). 
 
Risk management strategies 
 
An analysis of the protocols and post decision summaries sought to determine 
how respondents dealt with the risk of product failure, and their reasoning in relation to 
the purchase of extended warranty insurance. Table 4 classifies respondents into those 
who took the warranty, those who denied any existence of risk, those who rejected the 
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warranty and seemed to accept the risk, and those who proposed some alternative 
means of defusing it. The entire set of protocols and summaries was coded 
independently by two coders, and intercoder reliability was found to be satisfactory; 
any disagreements were resolved by discussion.  
                                                 Table 4 here 
 Many respondents opted to take out at least one of the warranty policies 
offered in the decision scenarios. Over half of the respondents opted to take the 
warranty on the washing machine (a new item) whereas less (two fifths) decided to 
buy the warranty on the car (a second hand item).  There was a significant correlation 
between buying the washer warranty, and the car warranty ( Pearson’s r = .24, p.< .05, 
n=95). 
Only a tiny proportion denied that any risk existed, indicating that the 
possibility of risk of product failure is well established in consumers’ minds.  A 
substantial proportion of respondents rejected the insurance, and proposed no further 
action.  However there were also a reasonable number of respondents, particularly in 
relation to the car, who had thought through an alternative course of action should 
their chosen product break down.  
 
Accepting versus rejecting the warranty 
 Reasons for taking or rejecting the warranty were reasonably straightforward 
to code, and inter-rater reliability was very high.  Table 5 shows the frequency of main 
reasons cited for making each of these decisions, and some verbatim examples are 
included below.   Only the main or first reason mentioned by each respondent is 
included in the tables, though some people mentioned more than one. A small number 
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of respondents gave responses which did not fit into these categories, or were 
otherwise unclassifiable.  
Table 5 here 
 
Reasons to accept the warranty  
1) Previous experience: this includes explanations which referred to either not having 
taken a warranty in the past, and regretting it, or having taken it, and having cause 
to use it, so the decision is to take it again. 
‘Well it’s just from previous experience with cars, I’ve bought cars in the past 
and had bad luck with them, and not got the extended warranty so I mean in 
the future that’s one thing I would definitely do’. (Resp. 8)    
2) Unreliability of the product: refers to the likelihood of the chosen washer or car 
breaking down – many in this group assumed this was a foregone conclusion.  
This confirms the high estimates of perceived likelihood of breakdown reported 
earlier.    Note that the brand new washing machine was perceived as even more 
likely to be unreliable than the second hand car.  
‘I’d insure against breakdown, because no matter how good it is, it can still 
break down’.(Resp. 30) 
3)  Expense of parts and labour: there was a perception that parts and labour were 
very expensive if they had to be paid for individually, and that over the course of a 
warranty, one would be likely to ‘break even’. 
‘It’s five years, it seems quite a good deal because parts and labour in 
particular are enormous, and these things are likely to break down in years 
four and five’.(Resp. 27) 
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4) Reasonable cost: this was commented on more often in relation to the car, and  all 
those who commented on the reasonable cost were those who had been given the 
cheaper price.  
‘ It seems quite reasonable really if anything goes wrong….it’s a good price.’ 
(Resp. 51) 
5) Peace of mind: a self explanatory reason concerned with not having to worry if 
things went wrong, as the problem would be taken care of. 
‘I would take out the warranty to put my mind at rest’. (Resp 95) 
 
Reasons to reject the warranty 
1) Previous experience: this was again one of two types.  Some respondents had 
taken a warranty in the past, and then not needed it and so perceived it as a waste 
of money. 
‘I don’t want the warranty, we bought one last time and never had to use it.’ 
(Resp 50)  Others had not taken warranties and not needed them, and felt 
that the same would happen again. 
2) Reliability of the product: in contrast to the gloomy outlook of the warranty taking 
group, these respondents said that they had chosen the most expensive, most 
reliable or ‘best’ product, and therefore there was no need for a warranty. 
‘I’m buying what I consider to be the top of the range machine, so buying 
mechanical breakdown insurance would seem to be counterproductive.’ 
(Resp. 45) 
3) Warranties expensive: there was a perception that warranties were very expensive, 
and often did not cover certain items, and were in fact a ‘bit of a con’. 
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‘I think that warranties are extremely dodgy, normally things that break down 
in cars are never covered by them anyway. I think they’re a good way of 
garages making money’. (Resp. 1)  
4) Pay for own repairs: these respondents said they would prefer to accept the risk, 
and pay for repairs as and when they became necessary. 
‘I would prefer to take the risk of paying for it to be fixed, if it went, broke 
down, and I could end up paying more, but I would prefer to do that.’ (Resp. 
46) 
 
Defusing operators  
The other main category of decision – to reject the warranty but to propose 
some other course of action proved more difficult to code. These defusing operators 
were discussed earlier, deriving from Huber (1997) and included long term plans, 
worst case plans, new alternatives, and those designed to reduce the probability of the 
negative event. Intercoder reliability in the categorisation of defusing operators was 
fairly low to begin with (Cohen’s kappa = 0.48). An examination of coder 
disagreements revealed that most of these were in the categorisation of new 
alternatives and long term plans. Both of these categories involve respondents 
bringing in their own new ideas to deal with the risk, however the main difference is 
that long term plans have a temporal component and make plans for the future. 
However, the two coders had difficulty agreeing on the application of this distinction. 
Indeed when these two categories were merged to form just one category, intercoder 
reliability increased to a Cohen’s kappa of 0.75. Hence, it was decided that these two 
categories should be merged to form one category, long term plans/new alternatives.  
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The final coding of this category can be seen in Table 6, and some verbatim examples 
are included in Table 7. 
Table 6 here 
 Some task differences in the use of defusing operators were found in that they 
were more common for the car than for the washer task; this is linked to the fact that 
more respondents opted to take the washer warranty, thus leaving less who needed to 
consider other options.  There were also differences in the type of defusing operators 
employed. For the car task, new alternatives/ long term plans were named by four 
respondents, whereas only one respondent named this category for the washer task.     
Worst case plans were the most common defusing operator for the car ( 20 
respondents) and the washer (15 respondents).  In relation to the car, these included 
using savings to pay for any breakdown costs , utilising separate parts guarantees, 
knowing a good garage or repair man, including friends or family.  For the washer 
task several claimed that they knew a repair man who could repair the broken washer 
for a reasonable cost.  For the car task, 7 respondents used defusing operators 
designed to control (reduce) the probability of the negative event. These included 
having the car inspected prior to purchase, avoiding long journeys, not keeping the 
vehicle for a long time, and regular servicing.  In contrast, for the washer task, only 
one respondent named a defusing operator designed to reduce the probability of the 
negative event which was to use the machine sensibly and not overload it.  
Table 7 here 
                                                            
Recognition Primed Decisions 
The protocol evidence in relation to both accepting and rejecting the warranty 
suggested that respondents’ decision making was influenced by their previous 
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experience of making insurance decisions in similar circumstances which also 
confirmed questionnaire data reported earlier.  These decisions can in some senses be 
seen as a form of Recognition Primed Decisions (Klein et al,1989).  The following 
text contains some examples of the Recognition Primed Decisions (RPD’s) employed 
by respondents, which illustrate both positive and negative orientations towards the 
offered warranties.  
 ‘…..on previous experience, all electrical goods.....I always take extended warranties’ 
(Resp. 80); ‘I’ve always taken it out, I’ve never actually had to use it, but I’ve always 
taken it on’ (Resp. 68);   ‘I've always had an extended warranty  with a washer and 
other, you know electrical equipment’ (Resp. 53); ‘(It’s) never been my preference to 
do so.....because it’s quite expensive over a period of time’ (Resp. 45) ;‘I always say 
no because you know, you've already paid for something’ (Resp 86).   Hence for many 
respondents insurance decisions were made with reference to their previous related 
insurance decisions. This type of strategy is useful in cutting down the amount of 
information processing the respondent has to carry out in real world risky decision 
situations.  Reference to a heuristic, in this case related to their policy on insurance, 
allows their insurance choices to be made with minimal effort and information 
processing. Respondents appear to make  ‘fast track’ decisions by making reference to 
previous similar decisions.   
In summary, the protocol data has provided much valuable evidence about 
respondents’ risk management strategies in relation to insurance choices.  
Additionally, in relation to the role played by previous experience in insurance 
decisions, there was evidence of Recognition Primed Decisions in the data.  
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4. Discussion 
This study has attempted: (1) to identify the information people want when 
they are deciding whether to insure against product failure at the time of purchase; (2) 
to describe their risk management strategies from a bounded rationality perspective, in 
particular with respect to Huber’s (1997) model; and (3) to examine the role of some 
key variables which might be associated with insurance decisions. 
When choosing a product, reliability information was assessed by some 
respondents in a direct sense, by asking for probability of breakdown, but these 
questions were in the minority, echoing Huber at al’s (1997) findings that respondents 
were not particularly interested in precise probabilities if they were not directly 
supplied.  However, some questions, such as the number of previous owners for a car, 
could be interpreted as trying to assess reliability in more indirect ways. Such 
questions indicate how people actively explore the possibility of product failure at the 
time of purchase. When deciding whether to take out extended warranty insurance, 
respondents mainly asked about the cost and the terms and conditions of the policies, 
as might be expected. A significant minority of respondents asked no questions at all 
about the insurance. The role of requested and non-requested insurance information in 
the risk management process is discussed further below. 
Many authors, including  Kunreuther et al (1978; Kunreuther, 1996) and 
Huber et al (1997) noted the limitations of Expected Utility (EU) theory in explaining 
decisions made in the face of risk in the real world. Analysis of the protocols and the 
questionnaires revealed a pattern of responding which was fairly consistent with an 
alternative, bounded rationality account: Huber’s (1997) model of the risk 
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management process. However, the basic form of the model could not account for 
some aspects of the results. 
Both EU theory and Huber’s model assume that insurance taking should be 
influenced by perceptions of the probability of the negative event. The difference 
between them is that the former assumes that the precise probability is important, 
whereas the latter assumes only that, if the probability is perceived to be above a risk 
detection threshold, then a risk management process is activated. A positive 
relationship was found between perceived probability of breakdown and tendency to 
accept the insurance for the washer task, but not for the car. The reasons for the 
absence of a relationship in the car task may be that more of those rejecting the car 
warranty managed the risk using alternative defusing operators. 
Johnson et al (1996) demonstrated that the availability of a negative outcome 
in a person’s mind may lead to a distortion of its perceived probability of occurrence, 
which in turn may increase the inclination to buy insurance. We found some evidence 
for this in that respondents who had experienced mechanical breakdown in the last 
year were more likely to accept the extended warranty. 
The questionnaire data showed that, for both products, median estimates of the 
probability of product failure were high, over 40%. Furthermore, the verbal protocols 
showed that for both products, the vast majority of respondents acknowledged that 
there was a risk of mechanical breakdown within the extended warranty period. Huber 
et al's (1997) analysis would predict that such respondents would all seek to defuse the 
risk in some way. In fact, our verbal protocol analysis classified nearly all of them into 
three groups, only two of which actively applied a defusing operator. 
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Insurance as a precaution 
One group, a substantial proportion of respondents, agreed to take out the 
insurance offered. Huber (1997) described buying insurance as a defusing operator 
defined as a precaution: an action taken at the time of decision which should buffer 
the impact of the negative event if it occurs.  Several findings indicated how people 
decided whether to take insurance and what factors influenced them. First, for the car 
task the questionnaire data showed that, compared to those not taking out the 
insurance, those accepting it believed that the costs associated with product 
breakdown would be higher. The cost of repairs was also mentioned quite often in the 
protocol data as a reason for taking the insurance. Second, as would be expected, the 
cost of the policy was associated with the insurance decision, and was frequently 
mentioned as a reason for both accepting and rejecting the insurance. Therefore, it 
seems that respondents often weighed the likely cost of not taking insure against the 
cost of taking it. 
One aspect of the cost of the insurance policies is rather puzzling. Respondents 
were much more inclined to take a warranty on the brand new item, than on the 
second hand item, even though the latter was the greater financial investment.   In 
addition, as a proportion of the cost of the item purchased, the extended warranty on 
the washer was significantly more expensive than that on the car. However, the 
absolute cost of the washer warranty was lower, and in addition, the cost was often 
framed as a small additional sum integrated into a monthly credit repayment. As 
Johnson et al (1996) found, the way the cost of insurance is framed can have a 
significant effect on its acceptability. 
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In addition to the costs of policies and repairs, other considerations clearly 
played a role. Respondents’ previous experience of extended warranties influenced 
their willingness to take out the insurance policies in these tasks, in that those who 
had taken warranties in the past were more likely to take them again in this study. The 
correlation observed between purchase of car and washer warranties provides some 
evidence of the existence of habitual ‘warranty takers’ and ‘non-warranty takers’ 
within this sample. This is consistent with the use of the Recognition Primed Decision 
strategy referred to earlier – people who habitually take (or don’t take) warranties 
essentially have no decision to make on each occasion when they buy a consumer 
product. Some respondents may have been influenced by recent publicity of reports 
which have concluded that extended warranties often do not represent value for 
money (e.g. Office of Fair Trading, 1996). 
Although some respondents used a recognition-primed ‘accept insurance’ 
heuristic and asked few or no questions, others attempted to evaluate the policy before 
accepting it, as described above in relation to cost. In addition to cost, people sought 
information about terms and conditions; those taking insurance believed that the 
policy was more likely to cover the breakdown (for the car task). One of the main 
determinants of whether a defusing operator is selected is likely to be the person’s 
beliefs regarding its probable effectiveness. For some respondents the information 
they received about terms and conditions reassured them about the effectiveness of the 
extended warranties as defusing operators, but others were not reassured. Lack of trust 
in insurance sellers was evident in many of our respondents, as illustrated earlier. This 
has also been reported in recent studies of the UK insurance market (Whyte et al, 
1998). 
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Accepting the risk 
A second group of respondents who perceived the risk (quite substantial in 
number) turned down the insurance and said that they would rather accept or bear the 
risk associated with the purchase than pay for the extended warranty. This finding is 
not readily interpreted within Huber’s (1997) model. It is possible that, especially in 
the context of moderate financial risks, the mere detection of the probability of a loss 
may not be sufficient to trigger risk management activity. Much of the literature on 
risk uses the concept of an acceptable, rather than a detectable risk. This suggests that 
a revision to Huber’s model may be useful, with a significant probability threshold 
replacing the detection threshold. However, it would be necessary to develop a means 
of independently measuring such a threshold if the model were to retain any predictive 
power. In addition, a significant loss threshold may be a useful concept in the context 
of moderate risks: a significant risk could be defined as one which exceeds both the 
significant probability and loss thresholds. 
A second reason that some people appeared not to manage the risk even 
though they acknowledged it is that our simulation method may have failed to identify 
some risk defusing activity. The absence of evidence of information processing in 
verbal protocols cannot be taken as evidence that the processing did not take place. It 
seems plausible that long-term plans may not have been mentioned by respondents, 
even though they had made them. For example, many respondents may have had 
savings as a buffer against unexpected losses, but few of them mentioned this. Finally, 
it may be that some respondents did engage in risk management activity but failed to 
identify an effective risk-defusing operator. For example, they may have rejected the 
insurance but not actually been able to constructed a satisfactory worst-case plan 
Risk management in everyday 29 
during the course of the interview. Both of these reasons point to some of the 
limitations of the conversation-based process tracing method used in this study, and to 
some important issues for further research. 
 
Alternative defusing operators 
 The remaining group of respondents rejecting the insurance behaved in a 
manner consistent with Huber’s (1997) model. This group also perceived the risk, but 
had thought of alternative means of dealing with it, rather than either taking the 
insurance, or bearing the risk.  Alternative defusing operators included long term 
plans/new alternatives, methods designed to control or reduce the probability of the 
negative event and worst case plans. It was difficult to differentiate between long term 
plans and new alternatives in the coding of the protocols because the temporal aspects 
of long term planning were difficult to identify unambiguously. In any event, the 
incidence of long term plans was low in this study. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, 
the role of long term plans in everyday consumer risk management is an important 
issue for future research. Defusing the risk by attempting to control the probability of 
mechanical breakdown was also mentioned rather infrequently. Huber (1997) has 
found that the frequency of use of different categories of defusing operator is very 
much context-dependent. One factor underlying this is that in different contexts 
people’s beliefs concerning the effectiveness of alternative defusing operators are 
likely to vary substantially. In the case of product breakdown, it is likely that most 
consumers believe it to be largely outside their control and therefore do not seek to 
reduce its probability. Worst case planning was the most common defusing operator, 
where the respondent had a plan of action in mind if the worst happened, but was not 
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prepared to invest time, effort or money at the point of purchase to avert risk. Further 
research is needed to identify conditions under which people prefer worst case 
planning to defusing operators involving prior costs. 
  
5. Concluding remarks 
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1995) used controlled conditions to investigate the 
effect of probability and monetary information on warranty decisions. They described 
the condition of not being presented with this information as decision making under 
ignorance, and were able to show that under such conditions people were more likely 
to take out warranty insurance.  In contrast, our simulation method allowed our 
respondents to control their level of ignorance (or knowledge) by asking as many 
questions as they wanted. Some of them, about 20%, asked no questions at all about 
the warranties, thereby remaining ignorant in Hogarth and Kunreuther’s sense.  Unlike 
Hogarth and Kunreuther’s respondents however, many of this group rejected the 
warranty.  We would argue that the verbal protocols show that most of our 
respondents, including the above group, were far from ignorant.  The protocols show 
that they brought to a realistic warranty choice problem a rich and extensive 
knowledge base. Some respondents used this knowledge base to apply a fast 
Recognition Primed Decision heuristic, while others were more deliberate in their 
decision making.   
We observed that most of those who asked for information wanted to know the 
precise cost of the insurance policy.  There was extensive evidence in the protocols of 
quantitative thinking with respect to warranty costs which were often weighed against 
breakdown costs.   In contrast most respondents did not seem to think quantitatively 
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about probability of breakdown; they did not seek precise probability information, 
although they clearly were concerned with the possibility of breakdown.  Such 
qualitative thinking with respect to outcome probabilities was evident in the protocols, 
and this is consistent with threshold models previously advanced by Kunreuther et al 
(1978; Kunreuther, 1996) and Huber (1997).  
We have quite consciously and explicitly adopted a descriptive research 
strategy in this study.  Despite the obvious limitations of a simulation method (we 
cannot for example simulate the emotions associated with buying expensive and 
desirable consumer products), we have been able to describe important aspects of 
information search and decision strategies not revealed by more traditional 
experimental methods.  Furthermore because our respondents were highly engaged in 
decision tasks using realistic information we can be reasonably confident that our 
findings generalise to real life consumer risk management. 
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Table 1 
Percentage of respondents asking questions about various aspects of the washing 
machine and the car (N=95). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  Washer           Car 
Aspect    Percent  Aspect   Percent 
 
Cost    72   Cost   60 
Spin Speed   45   Previous Owners 56 
Number of programs  26   Service History 36 
Type of programs  19   Accidents  25 
Type of machine*  24   Garage report  24 
Maximum load  20   M.O.T. 22 
Reliability   18   Fuel consumption 19 
Water consumption  10   Reliability   5 
Country of origin   9   Company car   4 
Wash times    8   
Manufacturer    4   
___________________________________________________________________ 
* Type of machine refers to whether it was a washer only or a washer/dryer. 
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Table 2 
The percentage of respondents taking out extended warranties according to their 
previous experience of this type of insurance   
 
______________________________________________________ 
Extended warranty experience   Washer task      Car task 
_______________________________________________________ 
No Experience  (n=28)   32  32 
Yes – With no claim (n=40)    60  43 
Yes – With successful claim (n=27)  70  56 
________________________________________________________ 
χ
2
 (2, N = 95)     8.88**  3.08 
 
** 
 p < .01  
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Table 3  
Percentage of questions asked by respondents (N=95) about aspects of the extended 
warranty.   
_____________________________________________________ 
Aspect    Washer task  Car task 
_____________________________________________________ 
Cost     73     72 
Terms & Conditions   44     56 
Duration    22     23 
Payment    14     19 
Insurer      4       2 
Initial warranty    7       5 
Procedure      8       9 
______________________________________________________ 
 
Note: In relation to the washer warranty, 18 respondents asked no questions at all, and 
in relation to the car warranty, 17 asked no questions. 
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Table 4 
The percentage (rounded up) of respondents employing each risk management strategy for 
the extended warranty decision  
 
_________________________________________________________ 
Strategy    Washer task  Car task 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Take Insurance    55      41 
Deny Risk      1        1 
Accept Risk/Reject Insurance  27      31 
Alternative defusing operator  17      26 
Unclear      0         1 
_________________________________________________________ 
Notes: (1) Cohen’s kappa = .83 for classification of protocols into these categories. 
(2) Those in the defusing operator category have also rejected the insurance, 
but are proposing an alternative strategy for dealing with the risk. 
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Table 5 
The number of respondents citing each reason as their main reason to accept or reject 
the warranty (N = 95) 
_______________________________________________________ 
Reason   Washer task       Car task   
_______________________________________________________ 
Accept Warranty 
Previous experience    7   5 
Unreliability    16   8 
Expense of parts and labour  12   6 
Reasonable price    2   9 
Peace of mind    10   8 
 
Reject Warranty 
Previous Experience    6   6 
Reliability     9   4 
Too expensive     7  12 
Pay as you go     4    3         
________________________________________________________ 
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Table 6 
 
The number of alternative defusing operators named by respondents for the warranty 
decision. 
 
____________________________________________________ 
Defusing operator     Washer task    Car  task 
____________________________________________________ 
Long term plans/ New alternatives    1    4 
Worst case plans    15  20 
Control probability of negative event    1    7 
____________________________________________________ 
Total      17  31 
____________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Some respondents proposed more than one defusing operator.  
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Table 7  
 
Examples from respondents’ protocols of alternative defusing operators 
 
 
Long term plans/new alternatives 
 
‘Yes, I wouldn’t consider that [ extended warranty] at all – I could put that towards 
another washing machine’. (Resp. 42) 
 
‘I’d pay money into an account every month, instead of paying for the warranty, that 
would build up to the warranty amount over the year.’ (Resp. 88) 
 
 
 
Worst case plans 
 
‘I  know a few people who know things about cars, so if anything was to go wrong I’d 
be ok.’ (Resp. 64) 
 
‘I have a certain amount of mechanical knowledge and would try to repair the 
machine myself. Or if I couldn’t do I would have one or two people I’ve used in the 
past for repairs.  So that’s the route I’d go down if something went wrong.’ (Resp. 44) 
 
‘£480 over two years is about £20 a month, I can’t see this car having that many 
problems. Anyway I can afford to pay a fair whack if something major went wrong 
with it’. (Resp. 2) 
 
‘If anything does go wrong, I’ve got a friend who actually used to work for [ names 
electrical superstore] and I would just call him out’. (Resp. 95) 
 
 
Control probability of negative event 
 
‘I would get it serviced regularly and hopefully wouldn’t need the warranty’. (Resp. 
46) 
 
‘If  I don’t overload it, and use it sensibly, do the usual things to keep it running 
reasonably…. I shouldn’t need the warranty’. (Resp. 73) 
 
‘I would take a mechanic with me to look the car over, and anyway I get it serviced 
every year which covers quite a lot of things’. (Resp. 79) 
  
 
